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Collapse of the Quebec Bridge, 1907
Cynthia Pearson1 and Norbert Delatte, M.ASCE2
Abstract: In the late 19th century, the transportation needs of Quebec led to proposals for bridging the St. Lawrence River. The Quebec
Bridge was the longest cantilever structure attempted until that time. In its ﬁnal design, the clear span was 548.6 m (1,800 ft) long. The
bridge project was ﬁnancially troubled from the beginning. This caused many setbacks in the design and construction. Construction ﬁnally
began in October 1900. In August 1907, the bridge collapsed suddenly. Seventy ﬁve workers were killed in the accident, and there were
only 11 survivors from the workers on the span. A distinguished panel was assembled to investigate the disaster. The panel’s report found
that the main cause of the bridge’s failure was improper design of the latticing on the compression chords. The collapse was initiated by
the buckling failure of Chord A9L, on the anchor arm near the pier, immediately followed by Chord A9R. Theodore Cooper had been the
consulting engineer for the Quebec Bridge project, and most of the blame for the disaster fell on his shoulders. He mandated unusually
high allowable stresses, and failed to require recalculation of the bridge dead load when the span was lengthened.

CE Database subject headings: Collapse; Bridge failures; Canada; St. Lawrence River; Failure investigations.

Introduction
The Quebec Bridge was 20 years in the making, from the found
ing of the Quebec Bridge Company in 1887 to the bridge’s col
lapse in 1907. A cantilever bridge was proposed as the most fea
sible design to bridge the harsh, icy waters of the St. Lawrence
River. The bridge collapsed during construction on August 29,
1907, killing 75 workers. Only 11 of the workers on the span
were recovered alive. Some bodies were never found. A second
attempt to bridge the St. Lawrence River was made. However, it
also suffered a partial collapse when the middle span fell into the
river. Thirteen workers were lost in the second collapse. The
bridge was ﬁnally completed in 1917, and stands today. A recent
review of the history of the bridge and the two collapses was
written by Middleton (2001).

Conception, Design, and Construction
The St. Lawrence River was the main channel of trade for Quebec
during the summer. During the winter, it ﬁlled with ice, and trade
was completely cut off until the river iced over and travel was
possible again across a dangerous ice bridge. The desire to bridge
the St. Lawrence River was fueled by Quebec’s need to be com
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petitive in trade. Montreal already had the Grand Trunk railway
system, which passes through it from the west connecting it to
Toronto. Quebec was left even farther behind when Montreal
began construction in 1854 of the Victoria Bridge, which was
completed in 1859, connecting it to western ports. This develop
ment quickly established Montreal as Canada’s leading eastern
port. Although the need was great, the job of bridging the St.
Lawrence would prove to be no easy task (Middleton 2001,
pp. 7–8).
The St. Lawrence River was approximately 3.2 km (2 mi)
wide at its narrowest section. Its waters were about 58 m (190 ft)
deep at its middle. The velocity of the river reached 13 or
14 km/ h (8 or 9 mi/ h) at times, and the tides ranged as high
as 5 m (18 ft). During the winter, ice became stuck in the
narrowest part of the channel and piled up as high as 15 m (50 ft)
(Middleton 2001, p. 3).
Interest in building the Quebec Bridge arose as early as 1850.
However, the project did not gather momentum until 1887, when
a group of businessmen and political leaders came together and
formed the Quebec Bridge Committee. Due to the high level of
interest in the project, the Canadian Parliament passed an act,
which incorporated the committee into the Quebec Bridge Com
pany, with $1 million capital and the power to issue bonds
(Middleton 2001, p. 27).
The company now faced the problem of ﬁnancing the great
bridge. Government funding was requested. However, no money
could be awarded for the project until the bridge site was selected.
With some ﬁnancial help from the local Quebec legislature, pre
liminary surveys were made. In 1898, after years of debate, the
Chaudiere site was selected from the three recommended sites to
be the location of the Quebec Bridge. With a site selected, bridge
design proposals poured in (Middleton 2001, p. 26).
On June 16, 1897, the chief engineer of the Quebec Bridge
Company wrote to a friend, who was also the president of the
Phoenix Bridge Company (Holgate et al. 1908). In response, the
Phoenix Bridge Company sent its chief engineer to meet with the
Quebec Bridge Company’s chief engineer at an ASCE meeting in
Quebec in 1897. The Phoenix Bridge Company offered to prepare

Table 1. Key Individuals in Design and Construction of Quebec Bridge
Name
A. B. Milliken
Benjamin A. Yensera
Arthur H. Birksa
Collingwood Schreiber
David Reeves
Edward Hoare
E. R. Kinloch
John Sterling Deans
Norman McLure
Peter L. Szlapka
Robert C. Douglas
Simon-Napoleon Parent
C. C. Schneider
Theodore Cooper
a
Died in the collapse.

Title
Bridge superintendent of erection for 1st year of work
General foreman of erection for remainder of project. Worked for Phoenix Bridge Company
Resident engineer of erection
Chief engineer for railways and canals
President of the Phoenix Bridge Company
Chief engineer for Quebec Bridge Company
Bridge erection inspector
Chief engineer for Phoenix Bridge Company
Bridge inspector, civil engineering graduate from Princeton, hired by Cooper
Chief designing engineer for Phoenix Bridge Company
Bridge engineer for railways and canals
President of the Quebec Bridge Company
Commissioned to review design work on the bridge after the collapse
Consulting engineer

plans for the bridge free of charge. In return, the Quebec Bridge
Company would then be obligated to give the tender for construc
tion of the bridge to the Phoenix Bridge Company. Theodore
Cooper, who learned of the Quebec Bridge project at the ASCE
meeting, offered his consulting services to the Quebec Bridge
Company(Middleton 2001, pp. 32–33). Some of the key players
in the construction and failure of the bridge are listed in Table 1.
The chief engineer of the Quebec Bridge Company, Edward
Hoare, had never before worked on a bridge longer than about 90
m (300 ft). The company decided to hire a consulting engineer,
and Theodore Cooper was selected from a list of six prominent
engineers for the project (Holgate et al. 1908, p. 36.; Middleton
2001). Theodore Cooper was an independent consultant operating
out of New York City. He was one of the foremost American
bridge builders of his day. To Theodore Cooper, this project
would be the crowning achievement to his life’s work.
Petroski (1995) notes Cooper’s strong qualiﬁcations for this
project. In his long career, he had written an award-winning paper
pioneering the use of steel for railway bridges, and had prepared
general speciﬁcations for iron and steel bridges. His method of
accounting for railroad loads on bridge structures became widely
used (Middleton 2001, p. 37).
Tenders were called for on September 6, 1898 and received
until March 1, 1899 (Holgate et al. 1908). They were then

reviewed by Cooper. The speciﬁcations called for a cantilever
structure. The basic conﬁguration of a cantilever bridge is shown
in Fig. 1. However, suspension bridge designs were allowed, pro
viding they came with their own set of speciﬁcations. Earlier,
noted French engineer Gustave Eiffel had considered the problem
and found that a cantilever design would be superior to either a
suspension or an arch bridge for the Quebec site (Middleton 2001,
pp. 29–30).
The concept of the cantilever structure was ﬁrst used in 1867.
William Middleton gives a clear deﬁnition of a cantilever bridge
in his book: “cantilever bridge: a bridge form based upon the
cantilever principal. In its typical form cantilever arms projecting
toward the center of the span from main piers are continuous with
and counterbalanced by anchor arms extending between the main
piers and anchor pier at each end. A simple span suspended be
tween the two cantilever arms completes the structure. The weight
of the suspended span and the cantilever arms is counterbalanced
by that of the anchor arms and an anchorage embedded in the
anchor pier.” (Middleton 2001, p. 175).
Six tenders were submitted for the superstructure, and two for
the substructure. After review, Theodore Cooper stated, “I hereby
conclude and report that the cantilever superstructure plan of the
Phoenix Bridge Company is the ‘best and cheapest’ plan and

Fig. 1. Structural behavior of cantilever bridge

Table 2. Bridge Member Deﬂections
Date of
observation

Member

(mm)

—

1.5–6.5

1 / 16 to

4

June

A3R and A4R

1.5–6.5

1 / 16 to

4

June

A7R and A8R

1.5–6.5

1 / 16 to

4

June

A8R and A9R

1.5–6.5

1 / 16 to

4

June 15

June

Fig. 2. Quebec Bridge just before collapse (Modjeski et al. 1919
used by permission of Library and Archives Canada, PA 029229)

proposal submitted to me for examination and report.” (Holgate et
al. 1908, p. 15., Middleton 2001, p. 34).
The Phoenix Company had been in correspondence with
Cooper throughout this process (Holgate et al. 1908). In addition,
the Quebec Bridge Company was in favor of the Phoenix Bridge
Company to win the tender (Tarkov 1986). This provides at least
an impression that the process was not fair and open, even though
Holgate et al. (1908) concluded “As to either party inﬂuencing
Mr. Cooper or causing him to modify his ideas so as to favour any
tender, such a suggestion is, in our opinion, quite out of the ques
tion, and we believe that Mr. Cooper made his decisions and gave
his opinions with absolute honesty” (Holgate et al. 1908, p. 15).
Two months later the company awarded contracts to the Phoe
nix Bridge Company for construction of the superstructure and to
the Davis Firm for construction of the substructure. However, the
Phoenix Bridge Company refused to sign a contract with the Que
bec Bridge Company due to the ﬁnancial provisions, which left
the bridge company open to considerable risk. Financial matters
were ﬁnally resolved in 1903, when additional funds became
available from a government grant. On June 19, 1903, a ﬁnal
contract was entered into between the two companies, and the
name of the Quebec Bridge Company was changed to the Quebec
Bridge and Railway Company (Middleton 2001, pp. 45–47).
The Quebec Bridge was the longest cantilever structure ever to
be attempted during its day. It would bridge the St. Lawrence
River approximately 14 km (9 mi) North of Quebec connecting
into the Grand Trunk rail line. The cantilever arms would reach a
distance of 171.5 m (562.5 ft). They were to support a suspended
span with a length of 205.7 m (675 ft). It would stand 45.7 m
(150 ft) above the river. The initial design clear span length was
487.7 m (1,600 ft).
However, in May 1900, this span was increased to 548.6 m
(1,800 ft) by Theodore Cooper. He stated that this would elimi
nate the uncertainty of constructing piers in such deep water,
lessen the effects of ice, and shorten the time of construction of
the piers. Although there were sound engineering reasons for this
change, it was also true that the lengthening of the span would
also make Cooper the Chief Engineer for the longest cantilever
bridge in the world (Petroski 1995, p. 46; Middleton 2001).
Construction of the bridge ofﬁcially began on October 2, 1900,
after a grand ceremony. The Quebec Bridge Company had enough
funds to begin erecting the substructure. The completed piers
would stand approximately 8 m (26.5 ft) above the highest water

Amount of deﬂection
(in.)
1
1
1
1

3

A8L and A9L

19

August 6

7L and 8L

19

August
August 20
August
August 23

8L and 9L
8R
9R and 10R
5R and 6R

8
Bent
—
13

5 / 16
Bent
—

August 27

A9L

57

24

4
3

4

1

2
1

level. The piers were made of huge granite facing stones with
concrete backing. The top 5.8 m (19 ft) of each pier was made of
solid granite. The piers were tapered 1 in 12 (1 in. / ft) until they
reached the dimensions of 9.1 m (30 ft) by 40.5 m (133 ft) at the
top. Each pier rested on a concrete ﬁlled caisson that was 14.9 m
(49 ft) wide, 7.6 m (25 ft) high, and 45.7 m (150 ft) long, weigh
ing 16.2 MN (1,600 t) (Middleton 2001, pp. 48–50).
Due to the unprecedented size of this structure, innovative
construction methods proved necessary. These were well docu
mented in frequent reports, with extensive illustrations, in the
Engineering Record (ENR 1907a,b,c,d,e).
Under a separate contract with the Quebec Bridge Company,
the Phoenix Bridge Company began the construction of the ap
proach spans in 1902 and completed them in 1903. Erection of
the superstructure portion of the bridge did not begin until July
22, 1905. The Phoenix Bridge Company agreed to have the struc
ture completed by the last day of the year in 1908. Otherwise, the
company would pay $5,000/ month after this deadline to the Que
bec Bridge Company until the project was ﬁnished (Holgate et al.
1908, Middleton 2001).

Events Leading up to Collapse
As the bridge was erected, workers and supervisors found notice
able midpoint deﬂections in some of the chords. When the work
ers tried to rivet the joints between these chords, the predrilled
holes did not line up. In addition, bends (deﬂections) were ob
served in some of the most heavily loaded compression members.
Over time, some of the member deﬂections increased.
The last photograph taken of the bridge before the collapse is
shown in Fig. 2. The panels were numbered from 1, at the outer
ends of the cantilever arms, through 10, at the piers. The anchor
arm panels added the notation “A.” The A9L notation, therefore,
refers to the chord located in the anchor arm, within the ninth
panel, and on the left or west side of the bridge. Some of the
major chords with their corresponding deﬂections, with the dates
of measurement, are presented in Table 2.
Deﬂections were ﬁrst noticed as early as mid-June, and were
reported to Cooper by his on-site inspector, Norman McLure.
Compression members had been cambered, so that under load the
joints would line up and could be riveted together. However,
some of the joints failed to close. Both men presumed that the
relatively small deﬂections had occurred due to some unknown

preexisting condition. They were not alarmed (Middleton 2001,
p. 72).
Subsequent inspections turned up more deﬂecting chords in
August. Again, these were reported to Cooper on the same day
that they were discovered. Cooper wired a message back referring
to chords 7L and 8L, asking, “How did bend occur in both
chords?” The chief engineer of the Phoenix Company replied to
Cooper saying that he did not know (Middleton 2001, pp. 72–73).
The chief design engineer for the Phoenix Company, Peter
Szlapka, was certain that the bend was put in the chord ribs at the
shop. He later admitted that he never actually saw the chords in
question. However, Norman McLure wrote, “One thing I am rea
sonably sure of, and that is that the bend has occurred since the
chord has been under stress, and was not present when the chords
were placed.” While this dispute of how the bend occurred in
chords 7L and 8L was going on, McLure reported to Cooper
another similar bend in chords 8L and 9L (Middleton 2001, pp.
73–74). The members with these deﬂections were the lower
chords of the truss on either side of the pier—the members with
the highest compressive loads under the negative moment across
the pier.
A disturbing pattern was emerging. The members under the
highest compressive loads were gradually buckling. These were
built up with latticing, and as they deﬂected higher stresses were
placed on the latticing as well as the rivets attaching the lattices to
the main compression members.
Being dissatisﬁed with the theories offered by the engineers on
site, Cooper developed his own theory. “None of the explanations
for the bent chord stand the test of logic. I have evolved another
theory, which is a possible if not the probable one. These chords
have been hit by those suspended beams used during the erection,
while they were being put in place or taken down. Examine if you
cannot ﬁnd evidence of the blow, and make inquiries of the men
in charge.” McLure did as he was instructed, and reported back to
Cooper that there was no evidence of such an incident (Middleton
2001, p. 74).
Some of the engineers were unconcerned about the problem,
believing that it was nothing serious. Others were still insisting
that the bends were the result of a preexisting condition. The
manufacturer guaranteed that all the members had been perfectly
straight when they left the yard. Another incident had occurred
during the 1905 construction season, when chord A9L was
dropped and bent while being handled in the storage yard. It was
repaired and placed into the structure. Although at the time the
repair was thought to be satisfactory, this member was later found
to be the triggering cause of the collapse.
Cooper, although the most experienced, seemed to be the most
confused by the problem. He was 60 years old at the time he
accepted the position of consulting engineer for the Quebec
Bridge project. He also accepted the responsibility of shop in
spector of the steel fabrication and erection. His health was poor
and because of this, he never visited the site once construction
began on the superstructure. His consulting services were based
on the information that was reported to him by others in charge.
Cooper’s ofﬁcial eyes and ears on the construction site was Nor
man McLure, a young civil engineer who had been appointed by
Cooper himself. Cooper was also very poorly compensated for his
work (Petroski 1995; Middleton 2001).
McLure continued to argue that the bends in the members had
occurred after they were installed. Some of the workers had ob
served the deﬂecting chords and were concerned enough to not
report to work for a few days. However, when McLure and Coo
per disagreed on the cause of the deﬂections, McLure did not

have the conﬁdence to contradict Cooper. Work continued on the
bridge. There had already been a 3 day strike over working con
ditions, and the workers who had not agreed with the new terms
had left. This greatly reduced the number of workers on the
project, and there was concern that a temporary stoppage would
cause more workers to leave and delay the project.
After another routine inspection, chord A9L was placed under
observation when its initial deﬂection of 19 mm (3 / 4 in.) had
increased to 57 mm (2 1 / 4 in.) in less than 2 weeks. The opposite
chord A9R was bent in the same direction. There was growing
concern about the deﬂections. One of the construction foremen
decided to halt work on the bridge until matters could be re
solved. On August 27, the same day construction was halted,
McLure sent a message to Cooper informing him that construc
tion would not resume until he reviewed the matter. The next day,
McLure went to New York to seek advice from Cooper
(Middleton 2001, pp. 78–79).
The erection foreman that had ordered the work to stop
changed his mind, and with reassurance from Edward Hoare, the
chief engineer of the Quebec Bridge Company, resumed work
again that day. The only reason given for this decision was in a
note from Hoare to Cooper stating, “the moral effect of holding
up the work would be very bad on all concerned and might also
stop the work for this season on account of losing the men.” Two
days later, news of the matter reached the Phoenixville ofﬁce and
the project superiors there met and discussed the problem. They
relayed a message back by telephone, saying that it was safe to
resume work on the bridge. They had somehow reached the con
clusion that the bends in the chords had occurred before they left
the yard. The Phoenix Company’s chief engineer had stated that
the chord members were carrying “much less than maximum
load.”
In the meantime, McLure was meeting with Cooper in New
York. Neither of the men was aware that construction had re
sumed on the bridge. After a brief discussion between the two
men on August 29, Cooper wired the Phoenixville ofﬁce saying,
“Add no more load to the bridge until after due consideration of
facts. McLure will be over at ﬁve o’clock.” Cooper’s reasoning
for informing the Phoenixville ofﬁce rather than directly relaying
it to the site, was that he felt that action would be taken faster if
the information went to the site through Phoenixville. McLure
had assured Cooper that he would wire the information to the site
on his way to the Phoenixville ofﬁce. In his haste to get to his
destination, he neglected to send the information.
The message from Cooper reached the Phoenixville ofﬁce at
1:15 p.m. It was ignored in the absence of the chief engineer. At
around 3:00 p.m. Phoenixville’s chief engineer returned to his
ofﬁce. After seeing the message, he arranged for a group meeting
as soon as McLure arrived. McLure arrived at roughly 5:15 p.m.
and the men discussed the circumstances brieﬂy before deciding
to wait until the next morning to decide a course of action
(Middleton 2001, pp. 78–80).

Collapse
Meanwhile, back at the construction site, at about the same time
the decision makers in Phoenixville were ending their meeting,
the Quebec Bridge collapsed at 5:30 p.m. The thunderous roar of
the collapse was heard 10 km (6 m) away in Quebec (Middleton
2001, p. 80). The entire south half of the bridge, approximately
189 MN (19,000 t) of steel, fell into the waters of the St.
Lawrence within 15 s. Eighty six workers were present on the

Fig. 3. Wreckage (Modjeski et al. 1919 used by permission of
Library and Archives Canada, C009766 and PA020614)

bridge at the time. Only 11 workers on the span survived.
The A9L bottom compression chord, which was already bent,
gave way under the increasing weight of the bridge. The load
transferred to the opposite A9R chord that also buckled. The piers
were the only part of the structure that survived. The wreckage is
shown in Fig. 3, looking from the south bank toward the pier. Of
38 Caughnawaga Mohawk ironworkers who had left their village
to work on the bridge, 33 were killed and two were injured
(Middleton 2001, p. 84).

Royal Commission Report
The Governor General of Canada formed a Royal Commission,
comprised of three civil engineers, whose sole task was to inves
tigate the cause of the collapse. They were Henry Holgate, of
Montreal, John George Gale Kerry of Campbellford, Ont., and
John Galbraith of Toronto. Their completed report consisted of
over 200 pages plus 21 appendices. As stated by Middleton

(2001, p. 91) “…the thoroughness and objectivity of their inquiry
and report stand even today as models of their kind.”
The immediate cause of failure was found to be the buckling
of compression chords A9L and A9R. The ofﬁcial report attrib
uted the collapse to a number of reasons. Listed below are some
of the major ﬁndings (Holgate et al. 1908, pp. 9–10):
1. “The collapse of the Quebec Bridge resulted from the failure
of the lower chords in the anchor arm near the main pier. The
failure of these chords was due to their defective design.”
2. “We do not consider that the speciﬁcations for the work were
satisfactory or sufﬁcient, the unit stresses in particular being
higher than any established by past practice. The speciﬁca
tions were accepted without protest by all interested.”
3. “A grave error was made in assuming the dead load for the
calculations at too low a value and not afterwards revising
this assumption. This error was of sufﬁcient magnitude to
have required the condemnation of the bridge, even if the
details of the lower chords had been of sufﬁcient strength,
because, if the bridge had been completed as designed, the
actual stresses would have been considerably greater than
those permitted by the speciﬁcations. This erroneous as
sumption was made by Mr. Szlapka and accepted by Mr.
Cooper, and tended to hasten the disaster.”
4. “The loss of life on August 29, 1907, might have been pre
vented by the exercise of better judgement on the part of
those in responsible charge of the work for the Quebec
Bridge and Railway Company and for the Phoenix Bridge
Company.”
5. “The failure on the part of the Quebec Bridge and Railway
Company to appoint an experienced bridge engineer to the
position of chief engineer was a mistake. This resulted in a
loose and inefﬁcient supervision of all parts of the work on
the part of the Quebec Bridge and Railway Company.”
6. “The work done by the Phoenix Bridge Company in making
the detail drawings and in planning and carrying out the erec
tion, and by the Phoenix Iron Company in fabricating the
material was good, and the steel used was of good quality.
The serious defects were fundamental errors in design.”
7. “The professional knowledge of the present day concerning
the action of steel columns under load is not sufﬁcient to
enable engineers to economically design such structures as
the Quebec Bridge. A bridge of the adopted span that will
unquestionably be safe can be built, but in the present state
of professional knowledge a considerably larger amount of
metal would have to be used than might be required if our
knowledge were more exact.”

Causes of Failure
The fall of this massive bridge can be traced back to several
technical factors. The top and bottom chords for the anchor and
cantilever arms of a bridge were typically designed as straight
members. This common practice made the fabrication of these
members easier. The bottom chords for the anchor and cantilever
arms in the Quebec Bridge were slightly curved, as shown in
Fig. 2, for aesthetic reasons. This added difﬁculty to the fabrica
tion of such unusually large members. The curvature also in
creased the secondary stresses on the members, reducing their
buckling capacity. According to a letter written to Engineering
Record, “As a rule secondary stresses are much more dangerous
in compression than in tension members, which seem to have

Fig. 4. Cooper’s allowable compressive stresses for Quebec bridge
(1 ksi= 6.89 Mpa)

been the ﬁrst to give way in the Quebec bridge” (“The Cause of
the Quebec Bridge Failure” 1907d).
Another concern during the erection of the bridge was the
joints. The ends of all the chords were shaped to allow for the
small deﬂections that were expected to occur when the chords
came under their full dead load. These butt splices were bolted to
allow for movement. The splices initially touched only at one end,
and would not fully transfer their load until they had deﬂected
enough for full bearing at the splices. At this point, they were to
be permanently riveted in place. The result was to be a rigid joint
that transferred loads uniformly across its area to ensure only
axial loading. Great care had to be taken while working around
these joints until they were riveted (Middleton 2001 pp. 70–72).
Adding to the design problems, Cooper increased the original
allowable stresses for the bridge. He allowed 145 MPa (21 ksi)
for normal loading and 165 MPa (24 ksi) under extreme loading
conditions. These were questioned by the bridge engineer for the
railways and canals as being unusually high. The new units
stresses were accepted based solely on Cooper’s reputation
(Holgate et al. 1908).
Cooper developed an allowable compressive stress formula (in
psi) based on the slenderness ratio (l / r) of the member
allowable compressive stress = 165 − 0.69(l/r) MPa
(1)

= 24,000 − 100(l/r) psi

where l=length of compression member; r=radius of
gyration=yI / A; I=moment of inertia; and A=cross-sectional
area.
Cooper’s formula is compared to contemporary allowable
stresses from the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC
1989) as well as the 96.5 MPa (14 ksi) compressive allowable
stress adopted for the second bridge (Middleton 2001, p. 107) in
Fig. 4. AISC curves are shown for both 230 MPa (33 ksi) and 250
MPa (36 ksi) steel. Cooper’s allowable stresses are higher than
those in use today by 3.3–8.7% over a range of slenderness ratios
from 10 to 100. Given the lower and uncertain quality of the
materials available to Cooper, along with the less developed state

of knowledge of compression members at that time and the lack
of testing of compression members, Cooper’s formula represents
an unsafe practice.
The Quebec Bridge was an enormous structure, and very little
was known as to how it would behave mechanically. The Quebec
Bridge Company lacked funding to adequately perform testing.
Cooper had required extensive tests on the eyebars, which formed
major tension members in the top chords. He did not require the
compression members to be tested. Later, Cooper would state the
reason for this as being, “There is no machine or method existing
by which any such test could be made” (Middleton 2001, p. 56).
However, when the company did ﬁnally secure funds for testing,
Cooper rejected the idea stating that too much time had been
wasted already.
Another oversight was that the stresses were not recalculated
once Cooper increased the span from 487.7 m (1,600 ft) to
548.6 m (1,800 ft). The stress calculations were based on the
487.7 m (1,600 ft) span dimension. Once this error had been
discovered and brought to Cooper’s attention, he immediately
made an estimate of the new stresses that would occur. He found
that they would be approximately 7% more. Weights were then
recalculated from the new information. They were found to be as
much as 10% in excess of those previously calculated (Middleton
2001, p. 65). The initial design weight for the bridge was ex
pected to be 276 MN (62 million lb). The real weight of the
bridge was estimated at 325 MN (73 million lb), an increase of
18% (Tarkov 1986).
In the rush following the ﬁnal ﬁnancial arrangements of 1903,
the necessity of revising the assumed weights was overlooked
both by the engineers of the Phoenix Bridge Company and by
those of the Quebec Bridge Company, with the result that the
bridge members would have been considerably overstressed after
completion.
Table 3, based on the Royal Commission Report, compares the
actual and assumed dead loads. “The difference between these
two sets of concentrations indicate a fundamental error in the
calculations for the bridge. In a properly computed bridge the
assumed dead load concentrations upon which the makeup of the
members is based should agree closely with the weight computed
from the dimensions in the ﬁnished design and with actual
weights” (Holgate et al. 1908).
At the time this error was discovered, a large portion of the
fabrication had been completed and a considerable amount of
bridge erection was ﬁnished. Cooper accepted these heavier loads
and stresses, in addition to the already high stresses set for the
bridge, as being within acceptable limits. His only other alterna
tives were to start over, strengthen the bridge in place, or abandon
the project.

Procedural and Professional Aspects
Cooper insisted on retaining full control of the project, even
at a considerable distance. Schreiber recommended that the

Table 3. Comparison of Assumed and Actual Dead Load
Assumed dead load
Element
Half suspended span
Cantilever arm
Anchor arm

Actual dead load

Difference

(kN)

(lb)

(kN)

(lb)

(%)

21,538
58,740
59,240

4,842,000
13,205,200
13,317,600

25,328
70,300
77,034

5,694,000
15,804,000
17,318,000

17.6
19.7
30.0

governmental agency of Railways and Canals hire a consultant on
their behalf. This engineer would, in a sense, be double-checking
Cooper’s work and ultimately have the ﬁnal authority. After ﬁnd
ing this out, Cooper, the Quebec Bridge Company, and the Phoe
nix Bridge Company immediately objected. In a letter to Edward
Hoare, Cooper wrote, “This puts me in the position of a subordi
nate, which I cannot accept” (Middleton 2001, p. 52). Cooper met
with Schreiber personally. Following this meeting, Schreiber re
vised his recommendation to eliminate the need to hire an addi
tional project consultant. The new amended order-in-council to
the Railways and Canals failed to deﬁne clearly how much au
thority Cooper would have over the project.
According to Middleton (2001, p. 53), “While there remained
a requirement to submit all plans for the approval of the chief
engineer of Railways and Canals, it was treated as a perfunctory
formality. When later modiﬁcations to the speciﬁcations appeared
desirable, Cooper made them without reference to the government
engineers, and there was no evidence that Schreiber ever ques
tioned a decision made by Cooper or interfered in any way with
the work.” This opinion is supported by a statement in a letter
from Deans to Cooper. In it he wrote, “The suggested action by
Mr. Schreiber would place the business in a much worse condi
tion than it was originally in.” He also wrote, “…it is simply
being necessary to have Schreiber’s signature as a matter of
form.” To further these implications, in a another letter from
Deans to Cooper, he wrote, “I have written him again, (Schreiber)
and urged him to stop entirely this proposed plan, and explaining
that the sole purpose of the order in council was to give you the
ﬁnal authority to settle all details, the government approval being
a mere formality, and in this way save time which was so valu
able” (Holgate et al. 1908).
No clear chain of command existed. It was assumed that the
ﬁnal authority rested with Theodore Cooper. All concerns were
directed toward him, even though, due to illness, he was unable to
travel to the job site. There was no one present on the job site
qualiﬁed to oversee this type of work or in a position to make a
decision, including a decision to stop work if conditions became
unsafe. Whenever the need arose, the authorities on site would
confer with each other before making any decision. In the few
occasions where a decision had been reached, there was hesitation
in carrying it out. The authors of the Royal Commission Report
wrote, “It was clear that on that day the greatest bridge in the
world was being built without there being a single man within
reach who by experience, knowledge, and ability was competent
to deal with the crisis” (Holgate et al. 1908).

Capacity of Compression Members
The commission had suspected that the A9L compression chord
failed due to improper latticing. Compression tests were per
formed on one-third scale models of the compression chords in
November 1907 and January 1908 to verify this theory. The com
pression chord members for the Quebec Bridge consisted of four
multilayered ribs (Fig. 5). They were stiffened by the use of di
agonal latticing to make them act as one unit. During testing, the
lattice system failed explosively due to shearing of its rivets, im
mediately followed by buckling of the chord. This conﬁrmed the
commission’s ﬁndings that the chords were inadequately de
signed. In Schneider’s opinion, “These members consist of four
separate ribs, not particularly well developed as compression
members, and their connections to each other are not of sufﬁcient
strength to make them act as a unit” (Middleton 2001, p. 97).

Fig. 5. Builtup compression members

Schneider wrote in his report, which was published as an appen
dix to the Royal Commission Report, “If a column is made up of
several shapes or parts, they have to be connected in such a man
ner that they will act as a unit. In an ideal column each part would
take its share of the load and no connection would be required. In
practice, however, as stated before, bending will occur before the
buckling load is reached, causing shearing strains which have to
be transferred through the connections, as latticing, tie plates, or
cover plates. These connection parts have, therefore, to perform
the same function as the web of a girder or the web system of a
truss” (Holgate et al. 1908).
This unprecedented large scale testing and studying of
compression members and their connections led to major ad
vancements in the ﬁeld of engineering. Bridge speciﬁcations were
improved after this collapse (Shepherd and Frost 1995). Another
advancement was the formation of two organizations, the Ameri
can Institute for Steel Construction in 1921, and the American
Association of State Highway and Transportation Ofﬁcials in
1914. These organizations advanced the ﬁeld of engineering by
providing the means to fund research, which had become too
difﬁcult and expensive for fabricating companies to conduct on
their own (Roddis 1993).

Ethical Aspects
Several ethical concerns can be pointed out in this case. The
major one is that deformations went unheeded for so long. The
engineers on site argued among themselves as to the cause. Al
though the workers who failed to report to work because of the
deformations lacked the technical expertise, they seemed to be the
only ones who understood what was really happening to the
bridge (Middleton 2001, p. 78). Engineers and others in charge
must be open minded to the ideas of the laborers, many of which
have years of experience.
Another ethical concern was Cooper’s rejection of an indepen
dent engineer to check his work. His decisions were not ques
tioned, even when they seemed to be unusual. An independent
consultant may not have allowed the higher than normal design
stresses. Some of the other errors such as the underestimated dead
loads and the failure to recheck the weight could have been dis
covered before the bridge collapsed. In the end, “Cooper’s engi
neering expertise became the sole factor that was relied upon for
assuring structural integrity of the bridge” (Roddis 1993).

Fig. 6. Completed Quebec bridge (used by permission of Library and
Archives Canada, PA044740)

Aftermath
The lives of those involved with the Quebec Bridge, from the
designers to the construction workers, were forever changed after
the accident. None however was affected as much as the families
of the ones who died and Theodore Cooper. Edward Hoare went
to work for the National Transcontinental Railway Commission.
John Deans continued to serve as chief engineer of the Phoenix
Bridge Company. He eventually became vice president of the
company. Szlapka continued his duties as chief designer for the
Phoenix Company. Cooper withdrew from practice to live out a
lonely retirement. He died only 2 days after the Prince of Wales
ofﬁcially dedicated the completed Quebec Bridge (Middleton
2001) (see Fig. 6).

Second Bridge
After the collapse, the government took over the design and con
struction of the new bridge. This also provided the ﬁnancial sup
port for the project. The second bridge was substantially heavier
than the ﬁrst. Petroski (1995) compares dimensions of the two
bridges, showing the dramatic increase in member sizes. The
cross-sectional area of the critical compression member for the
old bridge had been 543,000 mm2 (842 in.2), whereas that of the
new bridge was 1 , 250, 000 mm2 (1 , 941 in.2) (Petroski 1995,
p. 113; Middleton 2001, p. 116).
The second attempt to bridge the St. Lawrence also encoun
tered problems. The project suffered a second collapse in 1916,
when a casting in the lifting apparatus broke, causing the center
suspended span to fall into the water as it was being hoisted into
place from a barge. Thirteen workers lost their lives in this acci
dent. The 50 MN (5,000 t) span sank to the bottom of the river to
rest beside the wreckage of the ﬁrst bridge, which still remains
there today. The second bridge was ﬁnally completed in 1917 and
weighed two and a half times as much as the ﬁrst one (Tarkov
1986). The construction of the second bridge was very well docu
mented by a Report of the Government Board of Engineers,
Canada Department of Railways and Canals (Modjeski et al.
1919).

Conclusions
At Quebec, the greatest bridge in the world was under construc
tion in 1907 under severe ﬁnancial constraints, with inadequate

funds provided for either engineering work or the bridge con
struction itself. These constraints had delayed engineering analy
sis and led to adoption of unconservative speciﬁcations. When the
miscalculation of the dead load was identiﬁed, the measures taken
to reanalyze the structure were not adequate. On this project,
virtually every conﬂict between safety and economy was resolved
in favor of economy. Most of the poor engineering decisions were
made by the prominent consulting engineer, Theodore Cooper.
Cooper’s reluctance to travel to the site, based on his poor
health, led to confusion about responsibility and site supervision.
When skilled ironworkers observed the growing deﬂections, indi
cating a gradual collapse of the structure, a conﬁdent site super
visor might have realized the gravity of the situation and halted
construction. However, the engineers on the site lacked the con
ﬁdence and the authority to contradict Cooper’s judgments.
The Royal Commission Report, which investigated the col
lapse and identiﬁed the engineering and procedural errors that had
lead to it, remains a pioneering document in the ﬁeld of forensic
engineering. The lessons learned from the case had many impor
tant impacts on the engineering profession, particularly in Canada
and the United States.
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